The general went into the Stalingrad disaster with his eyes wide open

The general recognized the danger of the situation: "Army trapped," radioed Friedrich Paulus, the supreme commander of the German 6th Army in Stalingrad and the area west of the Volga, at 7 p.m. on November 22, 1942 to his superior staff, Army Group B. Yes the career officer, for all his well-known and undisputed competence, did nothing.

He could have ordered the tactical withdrawal of his troops through the still-thin wedge with which the Soviet 23rd Army from the north-west had joined the 23rd Army advancing from the south-east at Kalatsch. So make exactly the same independent decision in the field as several Wehrmacht commanders had done in Moscow in December 1941 in order to save their troops.

But Friedrich Paulus was no Erich Hoepner – Hitler had dishonorably dismissed this general from the Wehrmacht for “cowardice and disobedience” after his withdrawal order a little less than a year earlier. This also meant that the tank general, who had been successful until then, was stripped of all medals and decorations - as well as the right, which is actually a matter of course for a retired German officer, to be allowed to continue wearing a uniform.

Paulus certainly had the deterrent example in mind on November 22, 1942, when he decided not to do anything against the encirclement. The same applies to the instructions of the supreme warlord from the day before: "Despite the danger of a temporary encirclement", the 6th Army should hold its fronts in and around Stalingrad, the Führer's headquarters radioed at 3:25 p.m. on November 21, 1942.

The risk for the German troops on the ground was obvious. Even Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels was under no illusions; After he had received the news of the encirclement, he dictated to his secretary in Berlin: “This of course created an extremely threatening situation. If we do not succeed in breaking through this encirclement again, our Stalingrad and the entire Volga front will be endangered, and the southern wing of our eastern front will also be seriously endangered.”

Hitler reacted by sending his best strategist, Field Marshal Erich von Manstein, who had just been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the newly created Army Group Don, to the headquarters of Army Group B, which had previously been responsible for Stalingrad. Their chief, Generaloberst Maximilian von Weichs, spoke plainly: he considered the situation of the 6th Army "hopeless", the only chance was an immediate breakout. Manstein replied that this was only a "last resort" that he would only apply to Hitler "at the worst" - knowing that the dictator would most likely refuse permission.

Although Paulus was informed of this, he refrained from ordering his troops to break out of the pocket - instead he let the fighting around the center of Stalingrad intensify again. So instead of creating facts independently, he opted for deadly obedience to Hitler. As a reward, on November 30, 1942, he was promoted to Generaloberst.

Paulus was a desk general, had never led a division or a corps, but only ever carried out staff duties. Born in 1890, he actually wanted to become a naval officer, but was turned down and, after a short excursion to study civilians, joined the Imperial German Army in 1910 as an officer cadet.

During World War I he served as a battalion adjutant, as an orderly officer and as a staff officer, i.e. in the squadron; he was never even a platoon or company commander of front-line units. In 1919, Paulus, who was undoubtedly gifted in organizational matters, was taken on by the greatly reduced Reichswehr and worked as a regimental adjutant. It was not until 1927 that he was given responsibility for a troop himself for the first time, a company of the Württemberg Infantry Regiment No. 13.

In 1931 he graduated from the War Academy, which is the prerequisite for higher staff service. In doing so, Paulus demonstrated a talent for operational issues and an interest in motor vehicles, the camouflage department for the tank weapon, which was banned in Germany. In 1935, after Hitler had terminated the Versailles Treaty, Paulus became Colonel Chief of Staff of the Kraftfahrtruppe. His superior was Heinz Guderian, the mastermind of the German armored force.

The next task for Paulus was the beginning of 1939 as Chief of Staff of the XVI. Army Corps under Lieutenant General Erich Hoepner, another key Wehrmacht armored officer. But already in August, in the course of the mobilization, he switched to the 10th Army under the convinced National Socialist Walther von Reichenau. He organized the advance of the troops during the invasion of Poland and - under the new name 6th Army - in the spring and summer of 1940 through Belgium and France.

Paulus then switched to the army general staff and was responsible for preparing the plans for "Operation Barbarossa", the invasion of the Soviet Union. He also inspected his old acquaintance Erwin Rommel in the North African theater of war, whose independence went too far for Franz Halder, the chief of staff.

In late 1941, Reichenau, still Commander-in-Chief of the 6th Army, was promoted to Commander-in-Chief of Army Group South in the Ukraine. The field marshal recommended his former chief of staff as his successor. Paulus was appointed on January 5, 1942 and simultaneously promoted to General der Panzertruppen; his first troop command since 1927 - and only the second such function of his career. Without ever having commanded a division or an army corps, he was now in charge of an entire army.

Under his leadership - Reichenau had died unexpectedly - the 6th Army advanced on Stalingrad. On July 23, 1942, Hitler ordered the city to be taken simultaneously with the advance toward the Caucasus. Paulus knew his army was too weak for this, but he did not prevail over Hitler. He went into the catastrophe with his eyes wide open.

In order to get him to commit suicide, Hitler appointed Friedrich Paulus Field Marshal on January 30, 1943. Never before had an officer in this highest rank in the Prussian-German army been taken prisoner of war. Paul ignored the unspoken but unmistakable instruction. However, he did not surrender himself; he had his chief of staff, Arthur Schmidt, and the divisional commander, Friedrich Roske, do that.

As the senior prisoner of war, Paul was important to Stalin. He hoped to be exchanged for a Soviet general, but to no avail. Instead, he half-unwillingly became involved in support of the National Committee for a Free Germany and the Bund Deutscher Officers—both hybrids between communist propaganda institutions and anti-Hitler resistance.

In February 1946, Paulus appeared as a witness for the Soviet prosecution at the Nuremberg trial of the main war criminals. In Germany and among many veterans of the Wehrmacht, however, he was considered a "traitor". At the end of 1953 he returned to the GDR and lived in Dresden - although he did not put himself entirely in the service of the SED regime, but instead tried to find an independent position. Of course he was monitored by the Stasi. In 1956 he retired from public life due to a serious illness and died on February 1, 1957 at the age of 66.

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