Body city-Panne: External workers mistook valve

What is going on in the body city? The nuclear regulatory authority of the Federal government (Ensi) has made within a few days, two incidents in public, not at risk, according to their view, the security of the population and of the staff, however, shortcomings in the safety culture of the recent nuclear plant in Switzerland (Born in 1984). "Due to a faulty operation of a valve" increased on 20. September 2018 in the case of the storage of the so-called water separator the radiation exposure; the meter gave no audible warning.

The Ensi assigns the occurrence of the level 0 of the international event scale, as the physical city-have done operator, but the level 1 ("anomaly"). The nuclear regulatory reasons related to the "Occurrence of multiple human errors in the entire work process". The power plant, whose main shareholder is Axpo, have failed the quality assurance of its Work "partially".

The second incident relates to a staff member who had it at least since 2016 under certain radiation measuring devices on their ability to function to test. Instead, he wore fake data in the test reports. If he has further manipulated, is unclear. The staff was free. Details of the operator from privacy not to make reasons.

fakes 2001

The Ensi speaks of a "serious case of human error" – it is not the first. Already in 2001, two Opera had omitted to Work, expensive in the power plant and the corresponding protocols are a fake. In 2008, a mechanic wanted to two new hand fire extinguisher hanging and drilled six small holes in the protective shell of the nuclear power plant. The error, of no consequences in terms of security, remained undetected for years. Already at that time, there were indications of problems in the case of organizational questions, such as the supervision of external staff. The power plant operator promised to improve. And you do it again: Such incidents will not be tolerated, the processes would be analyzed and "in the sense of increasing the safety further developed".

The atomic critical of the Swiss energy Foundation (SES) referred to the incidents as "worrying". "City body", says SES expert Nils Epprecht, "heard from the network, until the operators got to grips with the problems." The Ensi sees it differently. There is a gap calls for investigation of incidents. The nuclear supervision authority will request the Board, as well as the Axpo Management and the work. To debate an international Review of the operational security is finally. Such an Osart Mission took place in 2012 in mill hill.

"body town heard from the network, until the operators got to grips with the problems."Nils Epprecht, Swiss energy Foundation

it is Unclear the reasons for the problems outlined above remain. The operator save in the case of security and staff training? You deny it: "In safety relevant areas, and nothing is degraded." Operators increasingly rely on external staff? At least in the incident of 20. September 2018, there was an "external contractor, the confused, the valve", as the operators will disclose on demand. Without third-party personnel is not a nuclear power plant come from however, body the city will annually supports about 1,000 external professionals. The affected valves have a simplified "and improved".

That external staff can be problematic, suggests the Ensi report on the incident. Are listed measures, the city body operators now have to be initiated. Therefore, the scheduling should be optimized in such a way "that radiologically challenging Work, preferably supervised by in-house staff".

(editing Tamedia)

Created: 07.02.2019, 19:16 PM