Crisis in Niger: the “ECOWAS standby force”, a phantom contingent with limited means?

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on Thursday ordered the deployment of its "standby force" to restore constitutional order in Niger in the face of the putschists. This should take place "as soon as possible", according to Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara. ECOWAS, which however still hopes to reach a peaceful resolution to the crisis, has not specified any timetable, nor the number or origin of the soldiers making up this "standby force". But Thursday evening, on his return to Abidjan, the Ivorian president declared that the heads of state of ECOWAS had given the green light for the operation to “start as soon as possible”. Alassane Ouattara further specified that Côte d'Ivoire "will provide a battalion" of 850 to 1,100 men, alongside Nigeria and Benin in particular, and that "other countries" will join them.

For ECOWAS, this is a first life-size test of its military capacity, because even if the West African States have had a joint armed force for thirty years, never this one never had to lead such a perilous mission. The history of the ECOWAS standby force also feeds many doubts or criticisms about the real military capacities of the States.

The establishment of an armed group by ECOWAS to carry out peace operations in the region dates back to 1990, during the civil war in Liberia. An "ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Brigade" called Ecomog is set up by ECOWAS, on the model of UN blue helmets: the forces mobilized within the framework of Ecomog are also called "white helmets".

This force mobilized on an exceptional basis was consolidated in 1999, when ECOWAS decided to make it a permanent group and broadened its objectives: it was no longer just a matter of enforcing the ceasefire between belligerents, but also of building peace, supervising humanitarian operations, carrying out preventive deployments and disarming non-conventional armed forces.

Finally in 2004, Ecomog became the Standby Force of ECOWAS (FAC). This is divided into five territorial brigades which correspond to the geographical areas of the region, and the 15 ECOWAS States undertake to contribute to the mobilization of this force by providing their own soldiers, drawn from the three arms (navy, army air force and army) as well as gendarmes, police officers and even civilians. The States also undertake to immediately make adequate means and equipment available to their troops.

The standby force intervened on several occasions in Sierra-Leone and Guinea-Bissau during the 1990s and 2000s. While it was not deployed during the recent coup in Mali or Burkina Faso, it was sent to Bamako in 2013 to fight al-Qaeda jihadists.

“On paper, it is a very solid mechanism, which can make the difference against the putschists” analyzes Me Oumar Berté, lawyer at the Paris bar and specialist in Community law for ECOWAS, author of La ECOWAS facing the unconstitutional changes of power in West Africa (L'Harmattan, 2022). The latter further specifies that the mobilization of this standby force this time takes on an unprecedented character in its scale: "it is the first time that it has been mobilized so quickly, without hesitation", he specifies, adding that it is Nigeria, since it currently holds the rotating presidency of ECOWAS, which will take the lead in operational command of this standby force intervention in Niger, by appointing an officer in charge of operations. These are supervised by the ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council. A meeting of ECOWAS chiefs of staff will be held in Ghana on Saturday, the community of West African states has also just indicated.

But Me Oumar Berté nevertheless underlines several weaknesses of this waiting force, which seems in many respects a mechanism that has so far remained more theoretical than concrete.

On the one hand, the mobilization of an armed force within ECOWAS has never been obvious to all member states. “At the time of its creation, there was a lively debate between the countries from the English-speaking bloc, who were in favor of it, following Nigeria, and those from the French-speaking bloc who viewed this tool with a dim view, in particular the Ivory Coast." As a result, states have repeatedly refused to mobilize their men alongside this military force: in 1990 in Liberia, Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire remained on the sidelines. In 2017, even if in the end the intervention of the standby force did not take place because the political crisis in The Gambia was resolved through mediation, Senegal was ready to intervene practically alone. The solidarity of the Member States is therefore not always self-evident. This time, Burkina Faso and Mali, in the hands of putschists, made it very clear that an intervention in Niger would be considered an aggression against them. Guinea, more cautious, is not far from holding such a speech either. “Togo is very much behind the decision to intervene”, also notes Me Oumar Berté. The mobilization of the White Helmets therefore seems to be more of a virtual possibility rather than a real force, as long as it is not fully effective.

The lawyer specializing in ECOWAS law also recalls that the difficulties of financing this standby force are numerous. ECOWAS has its own funds, partly from contributions from Member States and partly also from levies, as well as aid obtained from other international communities (the European Union, the UN, etc.). But it is only with reinforced financial support from these other communities that the intervention in Niger can be carried out: "Such an intervention will be long, because even if ECOWAS succeeds in getting rid of the putschists, it will have to remain mobilized on place in the long term to ensure that the country remains politically stable, he analyzes. This possible financial support will feed the suspicions of Western or European interference, deliberately handled by the putschists.

Be that as it may, if it is indeed mobilized to fight the putschists in Niger, the ECOWAS standby force will experience the first major test in its history. Faced with the multiplication of coups in the region, this test could prove decisive for the survival of ECOWAS.