Europe is only strong if Germany and France work well together

"There are tougher years ahead of us, rough years." In a keynote speech at Bellevue Palace recently, Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier impressively described the consequences of the "turn of the era" that Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz ended in reaction to the Russian war of aggression in Ukraine announced February.

Much is still open with regard to the sustainability of this supposed caesura, but in one area of ​​all things a turning point is becoming apparent that can neither be intended nor desired: in Franco-German relations. The annual joint cabinet meeting, formally agreed only a few years ago in the Treaty of Aachen, was canceled at short notice - no drama, but an indication that the Franco-German relationship is currently not intact.

Paris is frustrated by Germany going it alone and accuses Berlin of pursuing a “Germany first” policy. This perception is exaggerated, but the fact is the energy policy dissent: Scholz's 200 billion euro "double boom" against the high energy prices was criticized by France and others at the EU summit in Prague as lacking in solidarity.

The dispute over the Midcat pipeline – for gas from North Africa via Spain and France to Germany – illustrates the different energy policy orientations of the two countries. Paris stopped the project, also because of its own economic policy interests, which in turn triggered disappointment in Berlin about French obstructions to German interests. In fact, Germany and France need neighborly solidarity for their respective energy supplies.

In view of the security and defense policy developments, the long-stalled bilateral armaments cooperation is by no means a sideshow. The joint air combat system FCAS has not been going any further for some time.

France is not involved at all in the European air defense system that Germany wants to build together with 14 predominantly Eastern and Central European countries. And the fact that Berlin is now primarily using the special fund for the Bundeswehr to buy non-European weapon systems such as the American F-35 is entirely plausible, but certainly not a contribution to strengthening European armaments policy.

Taken on their own, these events appear to be minor differences, but overall they demonstrate different energy policy concepts and different foreign and security policy priorities. Germany's pronounced transatlantic orientation and the European sovereignty in defense and security policy demanded by Emmanuel Macron are by no means mutually exclusive. However, you have to talk to each other about it.

At the moment, the tendency to stubbornness seems to be strong on both sides, at least in the case of Olaf Scholz and Emmanuel Macron, one of whom obviously does not feel informed, slowed down or presented by the other. Neither Germany nor France benefit from this, and as always when the Franco-German engine stalls, Europe's relevance suffers. This is the worst possible prerequisite for overcoming the current crises, the political, socio-economic and ecological challenges and the foreseeable tasks that follow.

Because there are urgent changes in the area of ​​security and defense. Freedom needs security. That's why we need to bring more to the transatlantic relationship in order to remain credible and attractive to the US as an ally. Because neither Germany nor France, nor the European community as a whole, can protect themselves effectively for the foreseeable future without the military capabilities of the USA.

Relations with China and Russia must be fundamentally restructured. We must become independent of Russian raw materials, but we must not make ourselves dependent on other unsafe countries as raw material suppliers. We should primarily align our economic relations with like-minded, democratic partners with reliable contractual agreements. The sale of shares in a terminal in the port of Hamburg and a Dortmund chip factory to Chinese state-owned companies is purely based on business calculations, but is the exact opposite of the announced turning point.

European solutions are needed for all major challenges: in climate policy as in energy supply, in the necessary regulation of digital communication as in foreign and defense policy. Without a joint Franco-German position, there can be no European solution - especially not for the overdue EU reform. To this end, French President Emmanuel Macron has repeatedly made concrete proposals that the German side, most recently Olaf Scholz in his keynote speech in Prague, conspicuously failed to take up.

Not only Friedrich Merz is rightly concerned "that there is no longer a coordinated line between Germany and France on major international issues such as future dealings with China or the consequences of the Ukraine war". Right now, Germany and France must stand together to ensure a European approach. The Franco-German engine of European integration must not falter and certainly not drown. If the turning point is to be more than an inconsequential appeal, it must be implemented with sustainable reorientation. That can only be done together with Germany and France – or not at all.

On November 9, on this date of ambivalence in German history, we commemorate a historical event that is also perceived as a turning point: the fall of the Berlin Wall as a prerequisite for overcoming the division of Germany and Europe. And in January 2023 (?) we will celebrate the 60th birthday of the Élysée Treaty, with which Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle founded the Franco-German friendship, without which the European integration process would not have existed. Both historical events show that major changes are possible when they become necessary - but not as a result of national solo efforts, but as a result of a great joint effort.