Few things are as strongly embedded in Swedish politics as the resistance against nuclear weapons. Over a period of time after the second world war, we planned for their own nuclear weapons, but then turned the policy into its opposite. Kärnvapenbyggarna was nedrustningsexperter and influential politician Alva Myrdal and Inga Thorsson emerged as the nation's heroes.
This turn of events has been studied scientifically (Thomas Jonter, ”The Key to Nuclear Restraint”, Palgrave 2016), and still arouses interest among scientists and politicians the world over. Sweden has since the 1960s has been proactive and consistent in resistance against nuclear weapons and in the quest for disarmament.
In the survey carried out in the autumn of 2017 and 2018 pronounced approximately 85% of the Swedish people (and a majority in all parties) sympathy for an international ban on nuclear weapons. There have not been reasons to doubt the political will to stick to kärnvapenfrihet, take the distance from the major powers avskräckningsdoktriner and in all ways to promote disarmament.
They are contrary to the uncompromising approach to nuclear weapons, which have a strong basis in the opinion, official policy statements and the image of Sweden in the rest of the world.
the controversy around the UN-convention on a total ban on nuclear weapons (TPNW) is against the background puzzling. The investigator Lars-Erik Lundin mentions a long series of objections by the ”security” nature.
It is widely known that a long series of such collaborations has been established, in particular with Nato and Nato countries since Sweden joined the Partnership for peace (PFP) in 1994. Any list is not in the investigation, however, there is one such in the book ”Sweden, Nato and security” (Blix, Ekéus, Hirdman, Ingelstam, Celanders 2016). ”The many steps” have led to a far-reaching military integration between the Swedish armed forces and Nato.
together, We have a significant experience in the disarmament and other areas of foreign policy. We have included some of the sources of research literature, utrikesdeklarationer, propositions and investigations, we have conversed with folkrättsexperter, diplomats, politicians and people active in civil society movements. We have not at any time seriously needed to suspect that Sweden would have slirat in the issue of nuclear weapons. The reply from the Swedish Pugwash (where we are active) states: ”Nuclear weapons are not included in these collaborations and should not do so in the future either.”
This we know now after having taken part of the armed forces ' opinion to the state department by reason of lundin's Swedish investigation (Dnr UD2019/00979/NIS). It includes 14 pages plus a classified annex (hereafter, we call the opinion of the ”FM-referral”, the page numbers below refer to this). There is much that is worth to discuss, but we concentrate on samarbetsfrågan.
We should probably previously have imagined something and gets restless. In september 2014 signed the most extensive agreement between Sweden and Nato: the so-called värdlandsavtalet. This is not mentioned nuclear weapons. In the documentation that the department of defense in preparation for the parliament (Ds 2015:39) is also not a word about nuclear weapons. This kardinalfråga in Swedish foreign policy was not even mentioned in connection with this key Nato agreement is remarkable.
If Sweden ratifies or just sign TPNW the following would happen: ”the Swedish participation in the ongoing operations, planned exercises and training courses, as well as in the maintenance and development of equipment, in research and technology exchange, as well as access to samarbetsformat will likely be strongly impaired and the risk in some cases to impossible” (page 2).
If you still think this is all about a ”negative attitude” or some kind of punishment for the ”stigma” of Nato, removing the rest of the text all doubts. ”When nuclear weapon states are with multinational operations and försvarsövningar, so there is always an implicit nuclear dimension” (page 9). ”The armed forces observes that nuclear issues are an integral part of the activities and abilities at many levels of the great powers and Nato....The possibilities for Sweden to continue its participation in partnerships that have parallel nuclear activities, according to the armed forces ' assessment, be adversely affected if Sweden joins the convention” (page 11).
In the close recurs with great emphasis, ”a Swedish access to the convention will have a strong negative impact on the possibilities to receive or give military support against the current bi - and multinational partners” (page 13). There is reason to believe that the secret annex contains even more information on the – more or less ”implicit” – the nuclear dimension in the military-to-military cooperation.
In ”the many steps” does not have the strict approach to nuclear weapons has been respected, which we and most of us have taken for granted. With TPNW will be a series of questions to the fore, which should have been up on the table all the time. FM-referral gives, possibly unconsciously, a hint in the lines also refer to. ”Abilities and samarbetsformat that have an indirect link to nuclear abilities or is of the dubbelanvändningsnatur so far has not been excluded for the armed Forces” (page 13), our fetstilning).
Thus in plain terms: the armed Forces have been included in the kärnvapennära co-operation without any political leader has to put themselves against them.
Sweden shall not belong to any military alliance. This does not prevent consultations and contacts with Nato and our nordic neighbours. But what is non-alignment of the host when the armed Forces have been allowed to build up in a close dependent of a Nato that is directly linked to the Nato kärnvapenbeväpning and the avskräckningsdoktrin which is the alliance's actual foundation?
It is not ”stigma” we should worry about, but for the dependencies that the armed Forces now openly carrying would render impossible a continuation of the american policy of nuclear disarmament. The battles against the uncompromising approach to nuclear weapons, which have a strong basis in the opinion, official policy statements and the image of Sweden in the rest of the world. The decommissioning of nuclear weapons constitute a basis for our country and the survival of humanity.