The Swedish constitution does not work. It became clear during the recently genomlidna regeringsbildningsprocessen. It is no wonder that it can take a long time to form the government, as we have seen in many countries. However, it is unreasonable that the parties intentionally and without reasonable purpose can slow the process.
It has been said that the parliamentary situation is very complicated. It is not really true. Since the beginning of 2018, it has been clear that there would be three possible partikonstellationer that can reach the 175 necessary mandate to a government to be tolerated:
1) a left-of-center of the constellation, much like the now released until Löfven,
2) a center-right constellation, where a government is released forward by the former ruling coalition parties had agreed and The sweden democrats or
3) a ”storkoalition” where the Socialists and the Conservatives agree on how the country should be governed possibly together with any additional party.
Based on any of these three configurations had the various governments been formed, so look mandatmatematiken out.
It was awkward because some of the party gave for the overconfident information in the regeringsfrågan before the election. Instead of following the Perssonska the principle to keep all the doors open was the red lines that together defined the empty set.
It was awkward because some of the party gave for the overconfident information in the regeringsfrågan before the election. Instead of following the Perssonska the principle to keep all the doors open – ”I will take responsibility for the outcome of the election” – drawn red lines that together defined the empty set. For that a government could be formed was one or more of the party had to break the promises given to the electorate.
It took a long time because of the error in our constitution. Already in 1976, noted Gösta Bohman that the order which the president shall appoint the prime minister did not work. One reason is that when the election there is no president. Is elected president when parliament gathered, fifteen days after the election day.
Because the president is important, it often becomes a battle on this post. Other items in the parliament elected in consensus. If the chair has voterats five times since the new constitution was adopted. At the first vote, in 1979, became the choice appealed, failed, and had to be changed.
We now had the tour, and got a president who skillfully handled the task, and whose fairly, no question, but we can't have a regeringsbildningsprocess who trust to luck. Naturally would the president have the task to point out regeringsbildare. So it is in all parliamentary systems except Sweden, but it is probably difficult to now correct this mistake from Torekov.
1 A solution, which would mean that the president is not replaced at the election, and would increase the possibility for him to rise above party politics, would be that the president is elected in the middle of the term of office for a four year period. Preferably introduced at the same time, a rule that a president may only be reelected once. It would allow for a regime in which the parties will agree on a rotation system, where the major parties alternately holding the chair.
another problem is that elections are held in the autumn, so that the parliament gather just before the budget bill is to be added. Even with a frictionless form a government, as in 2006, a new government minimal time to write a budget bill and thus have an impact on their political orientation. Big changes are taking place can the administration of the state are affected by significant interference.
2 the Solution is to move elections to the spring. Why this did not happen when the state's fiscal year 1997 was added on to the calendar year is incomprehensible. With elections in spring gets a new government sufficient time to work out a bill that can be added at the regular time in september.
the Choice of spring would also put pressure on the regeringsbildningsprocessen, something that is now missing. The president can take a long time time, and party leaders can procrastinate. A natural order would be that parliament may not separate until it has chosen a prime minister. With the election on the first Sunday in may, the parliament gathered in the middle of the month. Normally, the parliament is plenifri from somewhere around skolavslutningstid in June. A guess is that the threat of non-sommarledighet can promote avoidance of the filibusters.
3 to put further pressure should time limits be introduced for when the president must propose a prime minister. A requirement should be introduced to a new prime minister will be proposed within 14 days after the prime minister dismissed. If a proposal falls, the next proposal to be added within a week. We saw that it was only when the president set deadlines regeringsbildningsprocessen could be brought to an end. It would be great if the support for time limits given in the constitution. In the event that the time-consuming sakpolitiska negotiations are ongoing, so can a rule be introduced that says that parliament can vote on whether to extend the time limit.
My last proposal relates to the extra options. We have had four additional options then the estates were abolished, the last in 1958. The Extra options should not be used carelessly, but now, the tool is nearly unusable. In a political crisis, there is often no one who can give extra options. A transitional government has not this power.
4 The easiest is that the parliament be given the opportunity to dissolve itself, by at least half, or a qualified majority of the members unite behind such a proposal. If an additional choice is allowed to shift the terms of office, so will be the extra options an effective way of resolving a parliamentary crisis.
Preferably be abolished at the same time, the government's ability to declare extra options, so we have moved some of the power which is excessive concentrated to the prime minister to the people's representatives in parliament.
But when consensus is needed, no laws. Then will you agree without looking in the book of the law. Laws are there for situations where the strong conflict.
I have the above-given four suggestions on how regeringsbildningsprocessen can work better when you do not agree on how the process should be taken forward. I think that our whole constitutional system should be reviewed in this perspective. The unsuspecting view on the conflicts that can arise around the interpretation of the constitution making, it is unclear how Sweden shall be governed when the political situation is unclear. It is high time that we are thinking through how the constitution should work when you do not agree on the rules of the game.