at The nuclear power plant Leibstadt AG, it is come because of a human error to a place of storage to a higher radiation exposure. The NPP has failed in accordance with the Supervisory authority Ensi, the quality of his Work "partially".
The new incident to show that the measures derived from the analysis of the causes of previous human errors, would have had no effect. The Swiss Federal nuclear safety Inspectorate (Ensi) on Thursday on its Website.
Specifically, it deals with an occurrence of 20. September, in storage of the water separator. This is located above the fuel elements in the reactor core. The separator removes water droplets that are entrained with the rising steam from the reactor core.
In the case of the storage of the water separator place of water came to an unexpected increase in the dose rate at the storage separator. The radiation exposure increased from 0.06 millisievert (mSv) per hour on 2 mSv per hour.
The dose limits for the radiation-exposed staff (limit: 20 mSv per year) were not exceeded. The incident was set in accordance with Ensi no radioactivity in the surroundings of the NUCLEAR power plant.
Incorrect operation of a valve
there was The nuclear power plant Leibstadt (KKL) on November 20. September 2018 in the annual revision. During this downtime, the water separator was expanded to 1.50 PM in the night and in the specially existing stock off the pool. Due to the faulty operation of a valve for this storage pool are failed, a seal part. This meant that the water level was dropped in the water separator storage pool, and as a result, the shielding of the radiation by the water attenuated, as the Ensi.
The nuclear regulatory authority of the occurrence of the level 1 ("anomaly") of the international event scale. The KKL was assigned to the case of the level 0.
"multiple human errors"
The Ensi justified the promotion with the "Occurrence of multiple human errors in the entire work process" of the KKL. It departed from its own operational requirements and Standards and have failed the quality assurance of its Work".
Unfortunately gave it in the last few years, a whole series of incidents due to human error in the KKL, Georg Schwarz, Deputy Ensi-Director and head of supervision in the area of nuclear power plants, cited. The Ensi had taken the first measures, which ensured that the safety culture in the NUCLEAR power plant "will be improved in the long term".
The KKL must demonstrate to the Supervisory authority why the measures taken so far measures have shown no effect. In addition, the KKL has to check why a dose-measuring device, there is no acoustic warning signal was in and what was the significance of the lack of Signal for the end of the incident.
forgery case, in the case of measuring devices
by the end of January, the Ensi had criticized the KKL with unusually clear words. One of the employees had carried out in contravention of regulatory requirements and operating instructions for 2016, three-neutron-dose-rate devices do not function tests.
The now-exempted employees had only listed the values of the test. After the forgery case, the Ensi requested by the KKL measures to improve the security in a sustainable way.
The Ensi-Directorate announced that it intended to request the Management of the energy group Axpo - who , as majority owner of the business of the KKL, and the power plant management.
The Ensi-Directorate wishes to bring to its own information, clearly expressed, that the accumulation of incidents in the area of people and Organisation will not be tolerated. The managers should now ensure quickly to ensure that the necessary measures would be taken. (sda)
Created: 07.02.2019, 13:56 PM